(2026-06) A Note on Combined Attacks on Fallen Sanctuary
2026-06-12
Leakage-resilient rekeying schemes aim to maintain cryptographic security in the presence of side-channel leakage by periodically refreshing ephemeral keys before sufficient information can be accumulated by an adversary. Fallen Sanctuary (LR4) is a recent higher-order leakage-resilient rekeying construction that achieves exponential security amplification with respect to the number of primitive encryption invocations and the number of traces required to compromise the physical security of the implementation. Its security, however, relies on the correct maintenance of internal counters and cached intermediate keys that enforce the prescribed trace bounds. In this work, we investigate the security of LR4 under a combined fault and side- channel attack model. We show that transient faults targeting the counter-update and counter-validation mechanism can prevent the advancement of the rekeying state, causing repeated reuse of temporal keys that are intended to be short-lived. As a consequence, the bounded-trace assumptions underlying the LR4 security proof no longer hold. We demonstrate that an adversary can accumulate an arbitrary number of leakage traces corresponding to the same secret state, effectively reducing the security of the protected primitive to that of a conventional implementation without rekeying. We evaluate the attack on a fault simulated implementation and analyze its impact on the leakage-resilience guarantees claimed by LR4. Our findings emphasize that leakage-resilient rekeying schemes must consider fault- induced violations of state evolution assumptions in addition to conventional side- channel leakage.