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(2026-05) On Succinct Non-Interactive Secure Computation with Malicious Security

2026-05-08

Abstract

A non-interactive secure computation (NISC) protocol allows a client with input xx and a server with input yy to compute f(x,y)f(x,y) using a single message from the client and a single response from the server. The protocol is called succinct if the size of the server’s message depends only on the output length and is independent of the size of yy and the complexity of ff. In the semi-honest setting, succinct NISC is known from fully homomorphic encryption (FHE). In contrast, malicious security is currently known only from non-standard assumptions, such as SNARKs for NP.

In this work, we construct maliciously secure succinct NISC protocols for natural and widely studied functionalities from standard assumptions, namely, FHE and batch arguments (BARGs). Our first result is a protocol for private set membership (PSM): the client holds an element xx, the server holds a large set SS, and the function outputs 11 if and only if xSx \in S. We then give several generalizations:

Our protocols achieve split-simulation security against a malicious server and standard security against a malicious client. Split-simulation is a relaxation of the standard real-ideal paradigm, where correctness of the client’s output and indistinguishability of the server’s view are guaranteed separately.

At the heart of our results lies a new simulation technique in which the server’s large input is extracted piece by piece and reconstructed into a coherent input. This reconstruction is enabled by a new monotone coupling argument based on Strassen’s theorem.