Verifiable secret sharing (VSS) is a fundamental primitive for secure computation and its round complexity has been well studied. The works of Gennaro et al. [STOC'01] and Fitzi et al. [TCC'06] settled the landscape in the perfect-security setting, showing that for the optimal corruption threshold , the exact round complexity is three, and for the sub-optimal corruption threshold it is two rounds. Similarly, Patra et al. [CRYPTO'09] and Kumaresan et al. [ASIACRYPT'10] settled the landscape in the statistical setting, showing that for (resp. ), the exact round complexity is three (resp. two).
Current protocols with optimal resilience incur three rounds even when the actual number of corruptions is sub-optimal. Fix corruption threshold parameters . We ask whether it is possible to obtain a VSS protocol that incurs two rounds when , and three rounds when . We show matching feasibility and impossibility results demonstrating that this is possible if and only if for perfect security, and for statistical security.