We give a public key encryption scheme with plausible quasi-exponential security based on the conjectured intractability of two constraint satisfaction problems (CSPs), both of which are instantiated with a corruption rate of . First, we conjecture the hardness of a new large alphabet random predicate CSP (LARP-CSP) defined over an arbitrary but strongly expanding factor graph, where the vast majority of predicate outputs are replaced with random outputs. Second, we conjecture the hardness of the standard XOR problem defined over a random factor graph, again where the vast majority of parity computations are replaced with random bits. In support of our hardness conjecture for LARP-CSPs, we give a variety of lower bounds, ruling out many natural attacks including all known attacks that exploit non-random factor graphs.
Our public key encryption scheme is the first to leverage high corruption CSPs while simultaneously achieving a plausible security level far above quasi-polynomial. At the heart of our work is a new method for planting cryptographic trapdoors based on the label extended factor graph for a CSP.
Along the way to achieving our result, we give the first uniform construction of an error-correcting code that has an expanding, low density generator matrix while simultaneously allowing for efficient decoding from a fraction of corruptions.