The FROST threshold signature scheme achieves round optimal Schnorr signing through a double-nonce construction, but requires two presignatures per signature. Since each presignature demands an expensive distributed key generation (DKG) protocol, this overhead is significant for high-throughput applications. FROST builds on a core presignature protocol (that we call FROST-core) that uses hash-based re-randomization of presignatures. We investigate whether fewer presignatures can be used to sign multiple messages, improving FROST-core's message capacity.
We first show that the natural generalization of using presignatures for messages is insecure: an extended ROS attack enables forgery even for . However, we prove that using presignatures for messages achieves security in the Generic Group Model combined with the Random Oracle Model. This improves message capacity from 50% (standard FROST-core) to , approaching 100% as grows.
We further extend our analysis to a modified FROST-core protocol in which a set of presignatures is generated by different parties and used for signing messages. Security holds as long as at least presignatures were created by honest parties.