1970-01-01

(2026-03) On the Security of MPC-in-the-Head Signatures with Correlated GGM Trees

• [[Thibauld Feneuil]]
• [[Matthieu Rivain]]

2026-03-28

• #cryptography
• #paper

Abstract

Recent MPC-in-the-Head techniques enable the construction of signature schemes with compact signature sizes from various hardness assumptions. These techniques rely on commitments based on GGM trees, which have been optimized to further reduce the signature size with the so-called one-tree or correlated tree optimizations. While the one-tree technique has no incidence on the security of the scheme, this is not obvious for the correlated tree technique, and a formal security analysis of this technique has been missing in the literature.

In this work, we fill this gap and provide the first formal security analysis of MPC-in-the-Head signature schemes based on correlated trees. We first exhibit a potential security flaw of this technique which rules out any hope for a security reduction to the underlying hardness assumption. In particular, we show that recovering the first $\lambda$ bits of the secret witness is sufficient to achieve a full key recovery (where $\lambda$ is the security level). The underlying assumption should hence be such that recovering these $\lambda$ bits is as hard as recovering the full witness. Some state-of-the-art schemes do not satisfy this condition, which prevents a direct application of the correlated tree technique.

We then provide a formal security proof for signature schemes based on the correlated tree technique under this degraded hardness assumption. Our proof comes in several variants, in the random oracle mode or in the ideal cipher model, depending on the specific correlated tree construction. We also introduce a tweak for the instantiation of the leaf seed expansion in the ideal cipher model, which allows us to achieve a tighter security reduction. Our result shows that MPC-in-the-Head signatures based on correlated trees can achieve strong security guarantees and provides the first formal security proof for the MQOM v2 signature scheme, the on-going candidate in the NIST post-quantum standardization process with the shortest signature size in the MPC-in-the-Head family.