We present the first general upper bound on permutation-based pseudorandom functions in the information-theoretic setting. We show that any non-compressing PRF, with input and output domain at least ([N]), making (t) black-box calls to any (t) public permutations on ([N]), can be distinguished from a random function over the output domain with at most (\widetilde{O}\big(N^{t/(t+1)}\big)) total queries to the PRF and the permutations. Our results suggest that the designs of Chen et al. (Crypto~2019) are optimal, among all possible constructions, in terms of information-theoretic security.
In particular, we propose the generalized key alternating construction, which captures permutation-based PRFs. We then prove that, for any such construction, there exists an explicit distinguisher achieving the tradeoff with constant advantage, where (Q_f) counts PRF queries and (Q_p) counts queries to each public permutation. We further extend our bound to blockcipher-based PRFs and to an adaptive setting in which each round may adaptively choose a permutation from a public family of permutations (\mathcal P). In this case, the general upper bound becomes (\widetilde{O}\big(|\mathcal P|,N^{t/(t+1)}\big)).