In this paper we study the problem of sampling random supersingular elliptic curves with unknown endomorphism rings. This task has recently attracted significant attention, as the secure instantiation of many isogeny-based cryptographic protocols relies on the ability to sample such "hard'' curves. Existing approaches, however, achieve this only in a trusted-setup setting. We present the first provable quantum polynomial-time algorithm that samples a random hard supersingular elliptic curve with high probability. Our algorithm runs heuristically in quantum gate complexity and in under the Generalized Riemann Hypothesis. As a consequence, our algorithm gives a secure instantiation of the CGL hash function and other cryptographic primitives. Our analysis relies on a new spectral delocalization result for supersingular -isogeny graphs: we prove the Quantum Unique Ergodicity conjecture, and we further provide numerical evidence for complete eigenvector delocalization; this theoretical result may be of independent interest. Along the way, we prove a stronger -separation property for eigenvalues of isogeny graphs than that predicted in the quantum money protocol of Kane, Sharif, and Silverberg, thereby removing a key heuristic assumption in their construction.