1970-01-01

(2026-02) Key Recovery Attacks on UOV Using p^l-truncated Polynomial Rings

• [[Hiroki Furue]]
• [[Yasuhiko Ikematsu]]

2026-02-18

• #cryptography
• #paper

Abstract

The unbalanced oil and vinegar signature scheme (UOV) was proposed by Kipnis et al. in 1999 as a multivariate-based scheme. UOV is regarded as one of the most promising candidates for post-quantum cryptography owing to its short signatures and fast performance. Recently, Ran proposed a new key recovery attack on UOV over a field of even characteristic, reducing the security of its proposed parameters. Furthermore, Jin et al. generalized Ran’s attack to schemes over a field of arbitrary characteristic by exploiting the structure of the symmetric algebra. In this work, we propose a new framework for recovering the secret subspace of UOV over a finite field $\mathbb{F}_{p^e}$ by generalizing these preceding results. First, we show that a key recovery against UOV can be successfully performed using the XL algorithm by exploiting the structure of the $p$-truncated polynomial ring $R^{(p)}=\mathbb{F}_{p^e}[x_1,\dots,x_n]/ \langle x_1^p,\dots,x_n^p\rangle$. This result simplifies the description of the attacks proposed by Jin et al.\ by formulating them in terms of the polynomial ring, independent of the structure of the symmetric algebra. Second, we generalize this result to the polynomial rings of more general forms, namely, the $p^\ell$-truncated polynomial rings $R^{(p^\ell)}$ for any $1 \le \ell \le e$. This result is due to our description in terms of the polynomial ring and can relax the constraints on the solving degree of the XL algorithm using $R^{(p^\ell)}$ by taking a larger $\ell$. Finally, we consider performing the reconciliation and intersection attacks using the $p^\ell$-truncated polynomial rings against UOV. In particular, we newly take into account the intersection attack using this framework, which has not been considered in previous analyses. Based on our complexity estimation, we confirm that the optimal complexity of the reconciliation attack using the proposed framework is consistent with that of the symmetric-algebra attack by Jin et al. We further show that the intersection attack using the proposed framework outperforms the reconciliation attack against the proposed parameters of UOV and reduces the security of multiple parameters compared to their claimed security levels. In addition, we show that our complexity estimation of the reconciliation attack using the proposed framework reduces the security of multiple parameters of SNOVA compared to previously known attacks.