We present a fault injection attack against MAYO that, from a single faulty execution, enables the recovery of structural information about the secret. We consider a simple fault model: a controlled perturbation in a single oil coordinate of a signature block, which induces an error (the secret subspace) with a known oil part. We show that the observable mismatch in verification, , can be expressed exactly as the image of under a publicly derivable linear operator , obtained by expanding and using (i) the bilinearity of the differential in characteristic and (ii) the key property for all . This linearization makes it possible to separate vinegar and oil coordinates and to reduce the recovery of the unknown component to solving a linear system over , under generic full-rank conditions for typical parameters. Once is recovered, the faulty signature can be corrected and, more importantly, a nonzero vector of the secret subspace is obtained, which serves as a starting point to scale to key recovery via known oil-space reconstruction techniques. We further discuss the practical feasibility when the exact position and value of the fault are unknown, showing that a bounded search over positions and values keeps the cost low for the official parameter sets, and that the attack is also applicable to the randomized variant of MAYO.