A large piece of scholarly work by President Herbert Hoover, acting as a critical history of U.S. policy during World War 2. The book draws greatly on Hoover’s personal experience during the war, and shows his point of view and opinions on U.S. actions. Despite this personal lens, Hoover tried to produce a rigorous scholarly work, employing a staff of secretaries to check his work for factual errors, and studiously citing his sources to the standards of an academic history of World War 2.
In furtherance of this and other books, Hoover also amassed an immense personal collection of historical documents, which constitute the many sources of the book. These are preserved in the Hoover Institute’s library, at Stanford.
The book remained unpublished for many decades, before being compiled and lightly edited by George Nash, in 2011.
Notes
Here are notes from my reading of the book, taken as I made my way through it.
Editor’s Introduction
Acts mainly as a narrative detailing the actions and public pronouncements of Hoover before and during the war, with a focus on how those contributed to his decision to start compiling this work.
Hoover was already bitter after his loss in the 1932 U.S. Presidential Election, to F.D.R., and published books critical of the collectivist path he saw the U.S. undertaking under Roosevelt. He also remained very critical of the U.S. getting involved in any conflict in Europe, even as Germany escalated actions in that theater. He did get very involved with furnishing aid to civilian populations in Poland, and Finland, echoing previous actions he undertook in Europe in the aftermath of World War 1, particularly in Belgium. This led to political clashes with the Red Cross as to responsibility for dispensing aid, as that organization felt, at times, like it’s responsibilities were overlapping with the organizations Hoover had created to supply aid, and that Hoover could do more to support their efforts, and to help with their fundraising.
After failing to secure the Republican nomination in the 1940 U.S. Presidential Election, Hoover retreated, somewhat, from political life, focusing instead on his scholarly pursuits. He did remain politically engaged, continuing to give public speeches and pronouncements. After Pearl Harbor (attack), he was in favor of the U.S. going to war against Japan, out of a sense of patriotism. His biggest critique of the way the war unfolded thereafter was the U.S. support of the Soviet Union. Hoover was in favor of a policy of letting Germany and the USSR undermine themselves in war, rather than supporting a communist regime.
After the war, Hoover continued to meticulously compile, edit, re-edit this book, with an extremely perfectionist stance, continuing to draft version after version, paying for expensive print proofs to see how the book would look in a potential final form, and employing a staff of secretaries to help edit and fact check it. The book was never published before his death, and is estate sat on the drafts before they were compiled in the present work only in 2011.
Section 1
Hoover explains communism, his reasons for opposing it, and advances the view that communism is not a benign, dormant ideology, but rather an active one, seeking to expand and foment revolutions in other countries.
Hoover also provides extensive documentation of communist infiltration into administrative positions in the federal government throughout the 1930s. Beyond that list of explicit Communist Cells, he also provides a list of Communist Fronts present in the U.S.. Most of them are related to labor movements, and span a wide variety of sectors.
Also documents instances of protests and events coordinated by the Soviet Union. One particular example is that of the Bonus March (event).
Hoover criticizes F.D.R. for the US Recognition of the USSR in the early ’30s. He points out that the conditions of recognition, that the Soviet Union not fund and coordinate communist activity in the US, was almost immediately violated and transgressed. Particularly in the Stalin era, the Soviet Union was cynical and did not have any sense of “honor” in its political treaties. According to the Realist Theory of International Relations, no country does. It seems to me that sometimes countries do act differently than raw material interests out of some kind of sense of virtue, or other non-material considerations.
Section 2
Provides an account of the condition of Europe before World War 2, mainly substantiated by a tour Hoover went on throughout Europe in the mid ’30s. The basic purpose of the tour was to meet with American diplomats and various European political leaders who wanted to meet with the former president, either because they had prior relationships with him, or because they wanted to award him for his aid work in the aftermath of World War 1.
The general mood was pessimistic about avoiding the prospects of increased tension, but with each individual country feeling powerless to act. The League of Nations expressed frustration at the U.S. not being more involved in preventing war, but couldn’t articulate a concrete path for intervention.
Interestingly, Hoover did get an audience with Hitler, and his conclusion from that conversation was that there were various sticking points around which Hitler was completely insane and unreasonable, going on crazy rants when they were even mentioned.
Another interesting point is Hoover’s visit to Latvia, under the Ulmanis Dictatorship of Latvia. It’s interesting to look back on how Ulmanis talks about suspending elections and banning political parties as if it’s just some normal political operation you take under if things get too unmanageable. I wonder to what extent the failures of parliamentary systems could have been avoided by very minor reform, for example moving past single majority vote by district, or splitting the executive into several members to allow for compromise, like in Switzerland.
Section 3
An overview of the events in Europe (i.e. escalations by Germany, basically) leading up to 1939 Invasion of Poland. This section is very factual, and seemingly devoid of any personal opinion from Hoover.
The remaining sections in the first volume continue a play-by-play of the progression of the War until the US enters, with occasional commentary by Hoover. The main turning points in terms of US policy are:
- providing Lend-Lease to the UK,
- being at times engaged with Germany over the protection of shipping routes,
- The historicity is unclear, but it seems that there’s an incident where U.S. ship might have intentionally trailed a German submarine for a few hours, before the submarine engaged the ship.
- placing troops in advance locations (Iceland, other Caribbean islands),
- having under-the-table deals with the UK essentially amounting to the drafting of war plans,
- providing Lend-Lease to the Soviet Union after Germany started war against them.
- This is one of the items Hoover is particularly critical of.
- not trying to reach a peace with Japan.
With regards to Japan specifically, the broad criticism implied in Hoover’s text is that the U.S. would have been able to reach a peace with Japan, with only minor concessions, had they only fully pursued the option. Under the pressure of economic sanctions, and with no peace in sight, the Japanese were of the mentality that war was inevitable, and that even a war they were guaranteed to lose was more desirable than a meek surrender. After that, an advance attack was inevitable.
One point of contention is whether or not the US could have been better prepared for the attack on Pearl Harbor. The US had intelligence that Japan was going to conduct some kind of attack. The contention is whether the US could have been better prepared for the actual attack at Pearl Harbor. Maybe the US could have alerted the pacific region in general of an incoming attack, and alerted its military bases in the pacific, preparing them for some kind of action.