# Signatures From Identification Schemes

It turns out that all you need to make a signature scheme is a way to prove your identity.

In fact, you can develop such a scheme from first principles, arriving at a deterministic signature scheme, commonly known as “Schnorr Signatures”. I’ll be trying to demonstrate that in this post. I hope to show that this signature system was too obvious to be patented.

That being said, I am not a lawyer.

# Identification

You arrive at “the club”. The bouncer asks you, “what’s the secret password?”. You tell him the “secret password”. He now knows you are indeed a member of “the club”. The bouncer knows this, because you know the “secret password”.

What you *know* is a great way to prove *who* you are.

Like many serious topics in security, we start with a game. The game involves a challenger, and yourself. You want to prove who you are to this challenger. You do this by exchanging messages with eacho ther. We call this game an “identification protocol”. At least, I do.

The simplest protocol follows the club analogy. We know some secret $\textcolor{red}{a}$. If a challenger wants to check who we are, we can prove our identity by showing that we know our this secret. The simplest way to do this is to send them the secret:

$$ \begin{aligned} &\small \text{Setup}\cr &\textcolor{red}{a} \stackrel{R}{:=} \{0, 1\}^n \cr \cr \hdashline &\small \text{A} \cr &\textcolor{red}{a} \xrightarrow{} \cr \end{aligned} $$

There are numerous problems with this scheme.

First, there’s no simple way to verify our identity. We could share a secret among members of some group. Members could then present this secret amongst themselves to verify membership. But we can’t prove our identity to a non-member.

The other problem is that we leak our secret every time we perform the protocol. We don’t want to leak our secret.

One way to avoid this is to mask our secret with another random value:

$$ \begin{aligned} &\small \text{Setup}\cr &\textcolor{red}{a} \stackrel{R}{:=} \{0, 1\}^n \cr \cr \hdashline &\small \text{A} \cr &\textcolor{red}{k} \stackrel{R}{:=} \{0, 1\}^n \cr &\textcolor{blue}{s} := \textcolor{red}{k} \oplus \textcolor{red}{a} \cr &\textcolor{blue}{s} \longrightarrow \cr \end{aligned} $$

Our proof of identity $\textcolor{blue}{s}$ can be shared publicly, without revealing our secret. This is because masking our secret using the xor ($\oplus$) operation makes it look completely random.

Addition modulo some number $L$ would also work:

$$ \textcolor{blue}{s} := \textcolor{red}{k} + \textcolor{red}{a} \mod L $$

The problem with this scheme is that our proof can’t be verified. The challenger has no information about $\textcolor{red}{k}$. The value $\textcolor{blue}{s}$ looks completely random to them. They can’t verify that we know $\textcolor{red}{a}$.

We can’t reveal $\textcolor{red}{k}$ without allowing the challenger to compute: $$ \textcolor{red}{a} = \textcolor{blue}{s} - \textcolor{red}{k} $$

We’re at a bit of an impass.

# A Technical Leap of Faith

This section presents a jump in our technical tools. We introduce
a cyclic group $\mathbb{G}$, of order $L$, and with generator $G$.
Our hypothesis is that if we have a scalar $x \in \mathbb{Z}/(L)$,
then calculating the element $H = x \cdot G$ is easy. But, given $H'$,
finding
what $x'$ is needed to produce $H' = x' \cdot G$ is very difficult.
This problem is called the “Discrete Logarithm Problem”.
There are groups where we know the problem is very easy,
like $\mathbb{Z}/(N)$. There are also groups where we *believe* this
problem is very hard. The main kind of group we use now is
a group of points on an Elliptic Curve.

If medium sized Quantum Computers come to exist, they will be able to efficiently solve Discrete Logarithms.

I don’t believe this is a problem we’ll have to deal with for at least 20 years.

Using a group is a breakthrough. This is because we can safely share $\textcolor{blue}{K} = \textcolor{red}{k} \cdot G$, even if we want to keep $\textcolor{red}{k}$ secret. This allows us to verify secret equations like $\textcolor{red}{a} = \textcolor{red}{b}$ by instead verifying public equations, like $\textcolor{blue}{A} = \textcolor{blue}{B}$.

Let’s update our scheme with this in mind.

$$ \begin{aligned} &\small \text{Setup}\cr &\textcolor{red}{a} \stackrel{R}{:=} \mathbb{Z}/(L) \cr &\textcolor{blue}{A} := \textcolor{red}{a} \cdot G \cr \cr \hdashline &\small \text{A} \cr &\textcolor{red}{k} \stackrel{R}{:=} \mathbb{Z}/(L) \cr &\textcolor{blue}{K} := \textcolor{red}{k} \cdot G\cr &\textcolor{blue}{K} \longrightarrow \cr &\textcolor{blue}{s} := \textcolor{red}{k} + \textcolor{red}{a} \mod L \cr &\textcolor{blue}{s} \longrightarrow \cr \hdashline &\small \text{B} \cr &\textcolor{blue}{s} \cdot G \stackrel{?}{=} \textcolor{blue}{K} + \textcolor{blue}{A} \end{aligned} $$

We now have both a private key, $\textcolor{red}{a}$, and a public key, $\textcolor{blue}{A}$. Our public key acts as our identity. The identification scheme lets us prove that know the corresponding private key.

We also have an equation to verify the validity of our proof. This equation works because:

$$ \textcolor{blue}{s}\cdot G = (\textcolor{red}{k} + \textcolor{red}{a})\cdot G = \textcolor{red}{k} \cdot G + \textcolor{red}{a} \cdot G = \textcolor{blue}{K} + \textcolor{blue}{A} $$

The reason this scheme works is pretty ingenious. We generate a mask $\textcolor{red}{k}$, which hides $\textcolor{red}{a}$ when added to it. But, we can allow the challenger to verify our operation, by providing a public commitment $\textcolor{blue}{K}$ to this random mask. This shifts a verification of a property of our secrets $\textcolor{red}{k}$ and $\textcolor{red}{a}$ into a verification about our public values $\textcolor{blue}{K}$ and $\textcolor{blue}{A}$.

There is one big flaw in this scheme though. Our challenger can reuse our proof to impersonate us.

After seeing $\textcolor{blue}{K}$ and $\textcolor{blue}{s}$, they can play this game with another challenger. If they just reuse these values, they will win the game. his allows them to convince a challenger that they know the secret associated with $\textcolor{blue}{A}$.

The problem is that challengers don’t act any differently, so the answer to one challenger’s question can be used for any other challenger.

To fix this, we can have the challenger randomize their challenge. Now we have to use this randomness to make a proof of identity tailored to this request:

$$ \begin{aligned} &\small \text{Setup}\cr &\textcolor{red}{a} \stackrel{R}{:=} \mathbb{Z}/(L) \cr &\textcolor{blue}{A} := \textcolor{red}{a} \cdot G \cr \cr \hdashline &\small \text{A} \cr &\textcolor{red}{k} \stackrel{R}{:=} \mathbb{Z}/(L) \cr &\textcolor{blue}{K} := \textcolor{red}{k} \cdot G\cr &\textcolor{blue}{K} \longrightarrow \cr \hdashline &\small \text{B} \cr &\textcolor{green}{u} \stackrel{R}{:=} \mathbb{Z}/(L) \cr &\longleftarrow \textcolor{green}{u} \cr \hdashline &\small \text{A} \cr &\textcolor{blue}{s} := \textcolor{red}{k} + \textcolor{green}{u}\textcolor{red}{a} \mod L \cr &\textcolor{blue}{s} \longrightarrow \cr \hdashline &\small \text{B} \cr &\textcolor{blue}{s} \cdot G \stackrel{?}{=} \textcolor{blue}{K} + \textcolor{green}{u} \cdot \textcolor{blue}{A} \end{aligned} $$

Our challenger gives us a unique bit of randomness that we need to use when producing our proof. This means that the result of one game can’t be reused again, since the challenger will be supplying a different value for $\textcolor{green}{u}$. This scheme is a secure identification protocol, but some variations of it wouldn’t be.

For example, we could try multiplying $\textcolor{red}{k}$ with $\textcolor{green}{u}$ instead, forming:

$$ \textcolor{blue}{s} := \textcolor{green}{u}\textcolor{red}{k} + \textcolor{red}{a}\mod L $$

The problem is that a challenger could supply $\textcolor{green}{u} = 0$, and then our proof would reveal $\textcolor{red}{a}$.

Another idea would be to have the challenger send us $\textcolor{green}{u}$ before we send our commitment $\textcolor{blue}{K}$. The problem is that this would allow us to cheat by choosing a devilish commitment.

If we choose $\textcolor{blue}{s} \stackrel{R}{:=} \mathbb{Z}/(L)$,
and then commit to
$\textcolor{blue}{K} := \textcolor{blue}{s} \cdot G - \textcolor{green}{u} \cdot \textcolor{blue}{A}$, then our proof will be accepted,
despite us not using any secrets at all. Because of this, it’s very important
that $\textcolor{green}{u}$ is chosen after $\textcolor{blue}{K}$.
In fact, we shouldn’t be able to figure out what $\textcolor{green}{u}$
will be until *after* we’ve generated $\textcolor{blue}{K}$, otherwise
this flaw would remain.

Thanks to Adrian Hamelink for bringing this one to my attention.

# A Conceptual Leap of Faith

At this point we have a secure identification scheme. A challenger can verify that you are who you claim to be. At least, they can verify that you own the corresponding secret for a public key. This protocol is dynamic. The transcript for one challenge can’t be reused for another challenge.

This is similar to what we want for a signature. The data of a signature should show that the owner of a public key signed off on this specific message. This signature should be unusable for any other message.

Here’s the leap of faith: a signature scheme is just an identification protocol, where the challenger is the message itself.

Conceptually, think of a bank teller asking you to sign a document. First, they challenge your identity. Satisfied with that, they then put a stamp on the document. Effectively, you’ve signed the document.

A digital signature is like this, except the document itself is issuing the challenge. What’s beautiful is that we can devise a scheme in which the way you’re prodded by a message is transparent, and knowable in advance. This will allow anyone with access to the transcript of the game you’ve played with the message to verify that you successfully proved your identity to the message.

This acts as a way of signing a message.

Operationally, this means replacing choices made by a challenger, with deterministic, but unpredictable, functions of the message and whatever knowledge it has at that point. To do this, we use hash functions.

A Cryptographic hash function has many useful properties. Essentially, a hash function acts like a random function on its inputs. You don’t really know what it’s going to output until you shove some stuff into it, and see what comes out.

We can use this to replace the random generation of $\textcolor{green}{u}$, with deterministic generation, based on a message $M$. We now calculate:

$$ \textcolor{green}{u} := H(\textcolor{blue}{A} || \textcolor{blue}{K} || M) $$

Now the “challenge” we receive is based on our public key, the commitment we’ve provided, and the message “challenging” us to prove our identity.

You can conceptualize this as follows. Each message is like a unique challenger in time. The function $H$ allows us to provide each of these challengers with a way of generating a random $\textcolor{green}{u}$, based on the information they’d have access to if the game were dynamic. Since $H$ is effectively a random function, it’s like each message is actually challenging us with a random $\textcolor{green}{u}$, since there’s no way to predict what the output of the hash function is going to be in advance, until we see the message.

We can now construct our signature scheme with this in mind:

$$ \begin{aligned} &\small \text{Setup}\cr &\textcolor{red}{a} \stackrel{R}{:=} \mathbb{Z}/(L) \cr &\textcolor{blue}{A} := \textcolor{red}{a} \cdot G \cr \cr \hdashline &\small \text{A} \cr &\textcolor{red}{k} \stackrel{R}{:=} \mathbb{Z}/(L) \cr &\textcolor{blue}{K} := \textcolor{red}{k} \cdot G\cr &\textcolor{green}{u} := H(\textcolor{blue}{A} || \textcolor{blue}{K} || M)\cr &\textcolor{blue}{s} := \textcolor{red}{k} + \textcolor{green}{u}\textcolor{red}{a} \mod L \cr &(\textcolor{blue}{K}, \textcolor{blue}{s}) \cr \cr \hdashline &\small \text{B} \cr &\textcolor{green}{u} := H(\textcolor{blue}{A} || \textcolor{blue}{K} || M)\cr &\textcolor{blue}{s} \cdot G \stackrel{?}{=} \textcolor{blue}{K} + \textcolor{green}{u} \cdot \textcolor{blue}{A} \end{aligned} $$

This is basically the identification scheme earlier, except that it’s no longer interactive. Instead, we produce a signature $\textcolor{blue}{s}$ alone, which consists of the public information we would have sent to a challenger. Others can verify the signature by computing the challenge $\textcolor{green}{u}$, and verifying the equation, as challengers did previously.

Some variations on the hash would compromise security. For example, if we didn’t include $\textcolor{blue}{K}$ in the hash, then we would run into the same issue as earlier, when $\textcolor{green}{u}$ was sent before $\textcolor{blue}{K}$. We would be able to forge signatures by choosing a fake commitment $\textcolor{blue}{K}$. By including the commitment inside the hash, we make sure that the random output depends on knowledge of $\textcolor{blue}{K}$, which prevents $\textcolor{blue}{K}$ from depending on the value of $\textcolor{green}{u}$.

We could also choose not to include $\textcolor{blue}{A}$ in the hash. I don’t think this compromises security. But, it’s a good idea to throw this in there, that way our challenge also depends on who we’re challenging, in addition to the message.

This is a secure signature scheme. In fact, it’s an incredibly natural signature scheme. All the choices we’ve made in designing it were pretty straightforward, and usually the easiest one to make. I’d say that this scheme is a natural consequence of using groups to create commitments, and of conceiving of messages as challengers in an identification scheme. Both of these ideas have widespread usage in more advanced protocols.

# Determinism

The scheme we have works. There’s just a tiny ugliness. That ugliness is that we need to generate, and not leak, a random $\textcolor{red}{k}$. This is a bit excessive for what we need. We don’t need a random $\textcolor{red}{k}$. It would be fine if running our protocol on the same message again produced the same signature. That might even be desirable.

What we actually need is for $\textcolor{red}{k}$ to be unpredictable, based on the message $M$, and also based on our control of $\textcolor{blue}{A}$, i.e. based on $\textcolor{red}{a}$.

One straightforward solution is to choose:

$$ \textcolor{red}{k} := H(\textcolor{red}{a} || M) $$

Even better would be to use a specialized *keyed hash*, designed
for this specific use case:

$$ \textcolor{red}{k} := H_{\textcolor{red}{a}}(M) $$

A keyed hash should be very difficult to calculate without knowledge of the key, and provide the same random guarantees as a hash function after that. Sometimes concatenating the key and the message is sufficient to produce a secure keyed hash, sometimes it isn’t. Using a scheme that provides this as a black box is better than rolling your own.

One problem is that we now use our key $\textcolor{red}{a}$ in two ways. As a key for a hash, and as a scalar for generating the signature. It’s generally a bad idea to use a key for multiple purposes. Instead, you should use a single master key, and then use a “key derivation function” (KDF) to derive new single-purpose keys for your different use cases.

This means having two KDFs, $\text{KDF}_1$, and $\text{KDF}_2$, and then deriving our hashing key and scalar from a master key:

$$ \begin{aligned} &\textcolor{red}{mk} \stackrel{R}{:=} \{0, 1\}^n \cr &\textcolor{red}{a} := \text{KDF}_1(\textcolor{red}{mk}) \cr &\textcolor{red}{hk} := \text{KDF}_2(\textcolor{red}{mk}) \cr \end{aligned} $$

(Note that in practice, you can use a single KDF function, and pass a different “context string” to derive different key values for different purposes. Note also that KDFs are often simple wrappers around hash functions).

At this point, we can use $\textcolor{red}{a}$ as we did before, and then use $\textcolor{red}{hk}$ exclusively for generating our nonce $\textcolor{red}{k}$:

$$ \textcolor{red}{k} := H(\textcolor{red}{hk}, M) $$

# Wrapping up

Collecting all we’ve seen so far, I now present to you, a fully deterministic signature scheme, depending on a cylic group $\mathbb{G}$ of order $L$, generated by $G$, and a hash function $H$, used to create corresponding keyed hash variants $H_k$, and KDF functions $\text{KDF}_x$:

$$ \begin{aligned} &\small \text{KeyGen}\cr &\textcolor{red}{mk} \stackrel{R}{:=} \{0, 1\}^n \cr &\textcolor{red}{a} := \text{KDF}_1(\textcolor{red}{mk}) \cr &\textcolor{blue}{A} := \textcolor{red}{a} \cdot G \cr &(\textcolor{red}{mk}, \textcolor{blue}{A}) \cr \cr \hdashline &\small \text{Sign}(\textcolor{red}{mk}, M) \cr \cr &\textcolor{red}{hk} := \text{KDF}_2(\textcolor{red}{mk}) \cr &\textcolor{red}{k} := H(\textcolor{red}{hk}, M) \cr &\textcolor{blue}{K} := \textcolor{red}{k} \cdot G\cr &\textcolor{green}{u} := H(\textcolor{blue}{A} || \textcolor{blue}{K} || M)\cr &\textcolor{red}{a} := \text{KDF}_1(\textcolor{red}{mk}) \cr &\textcolor{blue}{s} := \textcolor{red}{k} + \textcolor{green}{u}\textcolor{red}{a} \mod L \cr &\text{sig} := (\textcolor{blue}{K}, \textcolor{blue}{s}) \cr \cr \hdashline &\small \text{Verify}(\textcolor{blue}{A}, \text{sig}) \cr \cr &\textcolor{green}{u} := H(\textcolor{blue}{A} || \textcolor{blue}{K} || M)\cr &\textcolor{blue}{s} \cdot G \stackrel{?}{=} \textcolor{blue}{K} + \textcolor{green}{u} \cdot \textcolor{blue}{A} \end{aligned} $$

It’s quite stunning that there’s such a natural build up from a simple and obviously broken identification scheme to this little intricate signature scheme. I had a lot of fun dissecting how this kind of signature works, and why things are set up the way they are.

Hopefully I’ve conveyed some of that fun in this post.

# Addendum: Patents

Unfortunately, while this signature scheme is exceedingly natural, it was covered by a patent, filed by Claus Schnorr, from 1991 until 2008. Did this have the effect of rewarding Schnorr for his invention, through licensing? No.

Instead, it lead to the creation of a different scheme for signatures: DSA. This scheme has arbitrary modifications designed to skirt existing patents. At least, some people have intuited that.

Personally, I think DSA is an ugly scheme compared to the more natural Schnorr signatures. It is not only aesthetics, but the shape of DSA makes building more complicated extensions difficult. Thresholdizing Schnorr Signatures is easy, but thresholdizing DSA is substantially trickier.

Patents are intended to spur innovation. In this case, innovation was necessary avoid the arbitrary roadblocks imposed by patents.

I don’t think patents are the right tool for incentivizing innovation in Cryptography.